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I.IN'TRODUCTION

In the United States, the prosecution of organized crime raises
serious procedural questions. Three matters, in particular, are
worthy of consideration here. The first involves the application of
constitutional principles regarding the search and seizure provision.
The second is the newly refined and powerful prosecution tool of
forfeiture of property. The third looks to the ability of the
government to initiate long-term investigations and the later
evaluation of the accused's defense of entrapment.
This Article will explore these matters, looking to the
constitutional, policy, and practical implications of a broadening
"tHaynes Professor of Law, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg,
Virginia. A.B., 1968, University of California, Los Angeles; J.D., 1971,
University of California, Los Angeles. The Author acknowledges the excellent
assistance of Robin Dusek and Stacy Jones, College of William and Mary School
of Law, Class of 1998. «:!Paul Marcus, 1997.
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government attack on organized crime. I begin with an analysis of
the search and seizure provision.
II. APPLICATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
reads:
The right of the people to be seqll-e in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized. 1
This Amendment applies to both federal and state actions.2
However, the Fourth Amendment considers only the conduct of
government agents such as police officers and private citizens acting
on a request from the government. It does not apply to purely
private acts:
The Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful
searches and seizures, and as shown in the previous cases, its
protection applies to governmental action. Its origin and
history clearly show that it was intended as a restraint upon
the activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended
to be a limitation upon other than governmental agencies;
as against such authority it was the purpose of the Fourth
Amendment to secure the citizen in the right of unmolested
occupation of his dwelling and the possession of his
property, subject to the right of seizure by process duly
issued.3

1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
3. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921).

1998]

PROSECUTING ORGANIZED CRIME

1381

As protection from unreasonable searches and seizures is a
constitutional right, the government may face serious sanctions if
its conduct violates the Fourth Amendment. Evidence obtained in
violation of this Amendment is subject to the exclusionary rule in
both federal4 and state courts.5 This rule provides that the
government may not use evidence obtained illegally at trial. The
principle, as established, is not found in the text of the
Constitution. As noted in Wolf v. Colorado/ the doctrine of
exclusion "was not derived from the explicit requirements of the
Fourth Amendment; it was not based on legislation expressing
Congressional policy in the enforcement of the Constitution. The
decision was a matter of judicial implication."7 It was for this reason
that the United States Supreme Court initially limited the
application of the exclusionary rule. However, in Mapp v. Ohio, the
court held that the rule applied to the states as well as the federal
government.8
The Court established that this principle of exclusion is
necessary to deter police from improper behavior: "The rule ...
operates as 'a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard
4. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
If letters and private documents can [unreasonably] be seized and held
and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the
protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his right to be secure
against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those
thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the
Constitution.
!d. at 393.
5. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655.
We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation
of the Constitution is ••• inadmissible in a state court. Since the Fourth
Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the
States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is
enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as is used
against the Federal Government.

!d.

6. 338 u.s. 25 (1949).
7. Id. at 28.
8. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655-56.
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Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect,
rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.'"9
In keeping with this purpose of the exclusionary rule, unless the
state constitution provides otherwise,10 there are recognized
exceptions to the doctrine. While it cannot be used in the state's
case in chief, the government evidence may offer the limited
purpose of impeaching the defendant's in-court testimony. 11 Also,
the Supreme Court has held that the deterrent function of the rule
is ineffective in situations in which the police acted in good faith in
executing a warrant which later turns out to be defective. 12 In some
situations, then, such resulting evidence is admissible. There are
several situations, however, where the police are not granted the
benefit of this good faith exception to exclusion.
We do not suggest, however, that exclusion is always
inappropriate in cases where an officer has obtained a
warrant and abided by its terms.... [T]he officer's reliance
on the magistrate's probable-cause determination and on the
technical sufficiency of the warrant he issues must be
objectively reasonable, and it is clear that in some
circumstances the officer will have no reasonable grounds
for believing that the warrant was properly issued.
Suppression therefore remains an appropriate remedy if
the magistrate or judge in issuing a warrant was misled by
information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or
would have known was false except for his reckless
disregard of the truth. The exception [for good faith reliance
on a defective warrant] will also not apply in cases where
the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial role ...
9. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984) (citing United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,348 (1974)). See generally William}. Stuntz, 7be Virtues
and Vices ofthe Exclusionary Rule, 20 HARVARD J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 443 (1997).
10. Some states do require exclusion as a matter of state constitutional law.
See, e.g., Vermont v. Oakes, 598 A.2d 119 (Vt. 1991).
11. See Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
12. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 905-09.
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[because] in such circumstances, no reasonably well-trained
officer should rely on the warrant. Nor would an officer
manifest objective good faith in relying on a warrant based
on an affidavit "so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to
render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable."
Finally, depending on the circumstances of the particular
case, a warrant may be so facially deficient-i.e., in failing to
particularize the place to be searched or the things to be
seized-that the executing officers cannot reasonably
presume it to be valid. 13
The evidence gathered directly from the illegal search or seizure
must be suppressed. However, the use of other evidence acquired
either directly or indirectly from the illegally-obtained materials
may also be restricted. 14 This principle is referred to as th'e "tainted
13. Id. at 922-23 (citations omitted).
14. See Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340 {1939) ("To forbid the
direct use of methods thus characterized but to put no curb on their full indirect
use would only invite the very methods deemed •inconsistent with ethical
standards and destructive of personal liberty.'"); see also Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
In order to make effective the fundamental constitutional guarantees of
sanctity of the home and inviolability of the person, this Court held
nearly half a century ago that evidence seized during an unlawful search
could not constitute proof against the victim of the search. The
exclusionary prohibition extends as well to the indirect as the direct
products of such invasions. Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the Court
in [the Silverthorne] case, in holding that the Government might not
make use of information obtained during an unlawful search to
subpoena from the victims the very documents illegally viewed,
expressed succinctly the policy of the broad exclusionary rule:
"The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a
certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used
before the Court but that it shall not be used at all. Of course this does
not mean that the facts thus obtained become sacred and inaccessible.
If knowledge of them is gained from an independent source they may
be proved like any others, but the knowledge gained by the
Government's own wrong cannot be used by it in the way proposed."
Id. at 484-85 (quoting Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385,
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fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. So, in a situation where the
illegal search of a home leads the police to find a gun in the home
and a knife hidden in a car, both items would be excluded. The
evidence of the knife would be admissible, the "taint" would be
attenuated, if the government can demonstrate that the police
would have discovered the knife regardless of the illegal action, 15
the police obtained this evidence from an independent source not
connected to the illegal search or seizure, 16 or there is too weak or
too distant a connection between the illegal police search or seizure
and the challenged evidenceP Moreover, a defendant's intervening
act of his own free will can also break the chain between the
evidence and the illegal search or seizure allowing the admission of
the evidence.18
The key to applying the Fourth Amendment doctrine is the
definition of the appropriate terms, for if the police have not, in the
constitutional sense, "searched or seized" the individual, a defendant
cannot successfully assert a Fourth Amendment claim. Early case
law narrowly applied the exclusionary rule, refusing to label a
government action as a search or seizure unless the government
physically trespassed on the defendant's property, or specifically
searched the defendant's house, person, papers, or effects, as
enumerated in the text of the Fourth Amendment.
Thirty years ago, the Supreme Court took a drastically different
approach to defining search and seizure. In Katz v. United States, 19
the government used electronic surveillance without a warrant to
monitor a call made by the defendant from a public phone booth.20
In its decision, the Court turned from the traditional property
analysis to a new privacy consideration, _determining that the
392 (1920)).
15. This is referred to as "inevitable discovery." See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S.
431, 441-42 (1984).
16. See United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 475-77 (1980).
17. See New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 17 (1990).
18. See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 484-86.
347 (1967).
19. 389
20. See id at 348.

u.s.
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Fourth Amendment protects people rather than places.21 However,
this privacy approach required some action by the defendant: in
order to invoke the privacy rights associated with the Fourth
Amendment, the defendant must take steps to shield her privacy.
What one freely offers to the public, even in one's own home, will
not be protected by the Fourth Amendment, for no privacy
concern would have been expressed by the accused. 22
[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What
a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in
an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected.23
The Supreme Court has defined some of the privacy situations
which are particularly significant in combating organized crime.
Defendants do not have a recognizable interest generally as to the
government's use of an officer's normal senses and commonly-used
or generally-available enhancements, such as flashlights. For
instance, the Court has categorized helicopters as commonlyavailable technology, despite its mechanical sophistication, thus
stating that defendants normally have no privacy interest from
overhead observation.24 Drug-sniffing dogs have also been approved
under the Fourth Amendment because of the limited intrusion and
because a defendant has no privacy expectations in contraband
being transported in a public place.25
Electronic surveillance is of special importance in this area. The
Supreme Court decisions construing the Fourth Amendment have
evolved markedly since the 1928 case of Olmstead v. United States.26
21. See id. at 351.
22. See id.
23. Id.
24. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 {1989).
25. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 646, 707 {1983).
26. 277 u.s. 438 {1928).
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There, in the first wiretap case to reach the Supreme Court, the
majority concluded that police wiretaps did not constitute a search
and seizure.27 This decision emphasized that there was no physical
trespass onto the defendant's property and that conversations are
intangible and cannot be seized. Congress reacted to the issue of
wiretapping in the Federal Communications Act of 1934. Section
605 of that Act read: "[N]o person not being authorized by the
sender shall intercept any radio communication and divulge or
publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or
meaning of such intercepted communication to any person."28 In
line with Congress' intent in enacting the Federal Communications
Act, the decision in Katz expressly rejected Olmstead and its
progeny, holding that any form of electronic surveillance, be it
wiretapping or electronic surveillance, that violates a reasonable
expectation of privacy constitutes a search and/or seizure and is
subject to the limitations of the Fourth Amendment.29
[A]lthough a closely divided Court supposed in Olmstead
that surveillance without any trespass and without seizure
of any material object fell outside the ambit of the
Constitution, we have since departed from the narrow view
on which that decision rested... :
We conclude that the underpinnings of Olmstead and
Goldman have been so eroded by our subsequent decisions
that the "trespass" doctrine there enunciated can no longer
be regarded as controlling. The Government's activities in
electronically listening to and recording the petitioner's
words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied
while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a
"search and seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.30

27. See id at 441.
28. 47
§ 605 (1939).
29. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).

u.s.c.

30.Id
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The Supreme Court has defined the constitutional requirements
in cases of electronic surveillance. Berger v. New Yorfe3 1 established
the minimum standards for a valid warrant authorizing electronic
surveillance: (1) the warrant must describe with particularity the
conversations to be overheard; (2) a showing of probable cause to
believe that a specific crime has been or is being committed must be
made; (3) the wiretapping must be for a limited period of time; (4)
the suspects whose conversations are to be overheard must be
named; (5) a return must be made to the court, showing what
conversations were intercepted; (6) and the wiretapping must
terminate when the desired information has been obtained.32 In
addition, a neutral, disinterested magistrate must determine
whether a warrant should be issued for electronic surveillance.33
Congress has since enacted more stringent requirements for the
use of electronic surveillance without the consent of a party. Title
ill of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 196834
authorizes the United States Attorney General, or certain other
officials, to allow an investigating agency to submit an application
to a judge for an order permitting interception of wire or oral
communications. The application may only be authorized where
such interception may provi~e evidence of certain enumerated
federal crimes, including murder, robbery, extortion, bribery and
drug dealing. Upon receiving an application, the judge may grant
an interception order only if there is compliance with 18 U.S.C.
§ 2518 in that:
a. there is probable cause for belief that an individual is
committing, has committed, or is about to commit a
particular offense enumerated in§ 2516 of this chapter;
31. 388 u.s. 41 (1967).
32. See id. at 55-60.
33. See United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 317
(1972).
34. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1994). See generally United States v. Denman,
100 F.3d 399 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Spy Factory, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 450
(S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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b. there is probable cause for belief that particular
communications concerning that offense will be
obtained through such interception;
c. normal investigative procedures have been tried and
have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to
succeed if tried or be too dangerous;
d. . .. there is probable cause for belief that the facilities
from which, or the place where, the wire, oral, or
electric communications are to be intercepted are being
used, or are about to be used, in connection with the
commission of such offense, or are leased to, listed in
the name of, or commonly used by such person.35
An order granted under this title must give:

a. the identity of the person, if known, whose
communications are to be intercepted;
b. the nature and location of the communications facilities
as to which, or the place where, authority to intercept
is granted;
c. a particular description of the type of communication
sought to be intercepted, and a statement of the
particular offense to which it relates;
d. the identity of the agency authorized to intercept the
communications, and of the person authorizing the
application; and
e. the period of time during which such interception is
authorized, including a statement as to whether or not
the interception shall automatically terminate when the
described communication has been first obtained.36
One important law enforcement tactic in fighting organized
crime in which the Fourth Amendment generally does not apply is
35. 18 u.s.c. § 2518(3).
36. !d.§ 2518(4).
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with information freely given to undercover government agents.
Indeed, the Court has narrowly limited the constitutional reach
here, even in situations in which the agent electronically .records the
defendant's conversation. The key is that the accused voluntarily
spoke to the agent. The Court in United State v. Wbitil7 held that
one may not have a justifiable expectation that his trusted associates
neither are nor will become police agents, and that a different result
is not needed when the agent has recorded or transmitted the
conversations between the parties.38 Essentially, the defendant
assumes the risk that the ·person with whom he is conversing is an
informant for the government.
Inescapably, one contemplating illegal activities must realize
and risk that his companions may be reporting to the
police. If he sufficiently doubts their trustworthiness, the
ass9ciation will very probably end or never materialize. But
if he has no doubts, or allays them, or risks what doubt he
has, the risk is his. In terms of what his course will be, what
he will or will not do or say, we are unpersuaded that he
would distinguish between probable informers on the one
hand and probable informers with transmitters on the
other....
Nor should we be too ready to erect constitutional barriers
to relevant and probative evidence which is also accurate
and reliable. An electronic recording will many times
produce a more reliable rendition of what a defendant has
said than will the unaided memory of a police agent. It may
also be that with the recording in existence it is less likely
that the informant will change his mind, less chance that
threat or injury will suppress unfavorable evidence cuJ.d less
chance that cross-examination will confound the
testimony.39

u.s.

37. 401
745 (1971).
38. See id. at 752.
39. Id. at 752-53.
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Some have asserted that "[a] coherent interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment would treat government informants the same
way the Court treats governmental wiretapping."40 While these
critics would mandate the usual "constitutional requirements of
probable cause, [and a warrant], "41 the courts have not been
convinced.42 Indeed, the principal constitutional restriction
involving undercover agents is not the Fourth Amendment, rather
it is the Sixth Amendment. The Supreme Court has carefully
applied the right to counsel to situations in which the undercover
agent questions the formally charged defendant. 43 The exclusion of
the defendant's comments would apply even if the defendant is not
in police custody.44
ill. FORFEITURE45

One effective tool against organized crime has been the
forfeiture procedure. Property used in the commission of a crime
may be subject to state or federal seizure, without compensation,
even when the property was obtained lawfully.
40. Tracey Machlin, Informants and the Fourth Amendment: A
Reconsideration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 573, 628 (1996); see also Commonwealth v.
Schaeffer, 688 A.2d 1143 {Pa. 1993) (interpreting a state constitution).
41. Machlin, supra note 40, at 575.
42. See id. at 634. "A home or private conversation should not lose its
constitutional protection against promiscuous police intrusion merely because
an individual has allowed a third party's presence. When it comes to Fourth
Amendment rights, the difference between the police and everyone else matters."
Id. at 634-35.
43. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 204-05 (1964).
44. See id at 205.
45. The Author notes in the summer of 1998, the United States Supreme
Court decided United States v. Bajakajian. 118 S. Ct. 2028 (1998). In this case the
Court, for the first time, struck down a forfeiture as being "grossly
disproportional" to the crime. In a 5-4 decision, Justice Thomas for the majority
emphasized that the "amount of the forfeiture [did not] bear some relationship
to the gravity of the offense that it is designed to punish." Id. at 2036. As such,
the penalty in the case was deemed to violate the Excessive Fines Clause of the
Eighth Amendment. See id. at 2038.

1998]

PROSECUTING ORGANIZED CRIME

1391

Two separate kinds of forfeiture exist in the United States.
Criminal forfeiture is a seizure that results from a criminal
conviction under a statute that requires the relinquishing of specific
property, such as vehicles used in drug transactions. Civil forfeiture
is not dependent on the defendant's conviction of a crime. Though
civil forfeiture proceedings may sometimes follow a criminal trial,
the civil forfeiture action is a separate and independent process
brought by the govemment.46 The standard of proof in civil
forfeiture proceedings is much less than that required by a criminal
trial; usually the government need only prove the defendant's guilt
by a preponderance of the evidence.47
One of the primary difficulties in applying forfeiture statutes
concerns jointly held property. The government must protect
innocent persons. Forfeiture of jointly owned property may injure
an innocent person who was not responsible for, and not
knowledgeable of, the defendant's wrongdoing. Eliminating the
remedy of forfeiture in such a setting may, however, discourage law
enforcement initiatives and may also encourage criminals to place
property with other individuals.
The Supreme Court explored -this tension between the
protection of innocent persons and the imposition of forfeiture
proceedings in Bennis v. Michigan. 48 In Beanis, the husband used the
family automobile, of which his wife was a joint owner, to engage
in unlawful sexual activities with a prostitute. State law required the
forfeiture of property used in such criminal activities; the state took
ownership of the car despite the wife's interest in it. She protested,
asserting that her substantial interest in the property had been taken
even though she did nothing wrong and had no knowledge of
wrongdoing.49 The Supreme Court rejected this "innocent owner
defense" a..."'l.d upheld the state forfeiture law:
[Petitioner] claims she was entitled to contest the abatement
46. See generally 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1994).
47. See id.
48. 516 u.s. 442 (1996).
49. See id. at 446.
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by showing she did not know her husband would use it to
violate Michigan's indecency law. But a long and unbroken
line of cases holds that an owner's interest in property may
be forfeited by reason of the use to which the property is
put even though the owner did not know that it was to be
put to such use....
She did not know that her car would be used in an illegal
activity that would subject it to forfeiture. But ... the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not
protect her interest against forfeiture by the government.50
Another major issue concerning forfeiture statutes is the
question of whether such actions violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the United States Constitution if they are utilized after a
criminal conviction.51 The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment reads: "nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. "52 In United
States v. Ursery, 53 the defendant was convicted of various criminal
charges. The government then filed a civil action for forfeiture
against the same defendant for the same criminal acts.54 The
Supreme Court allowed the forfeiture proceeding because "these in
rem civil forfeitures are neither 'punishment' nor criminal for
purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause."55 The Court strongly
supported the property forfeiture remedy stating:
Since the earliest years of this Nation, Congress has
authorized the Government to seek parallel in rem civil
forfeiture actions and criminal prosecutions based upon the
50. Id. at 446, 449.
51. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602,629 (1993) raised the constitutional
concern in its conclusion that a civil judgment may serve, in part, to "punish"
the owner of forfeited property.
52. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
53. 518 u.s. 267 (1996).
54. See id.
55. Id. at 292.
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same underlying events. And, in a long line of cases, this
Court has considered the application of the Double
Jeopardy Clause to civil forfeitures, consistendy concluding
that the Clause does not apply to such actions because they
do not impose punishment....
"[U]nless the forfeiture sanction was intended as
punishment, so that the proceeding is essentially criminal in
character, the Double Jeopardy Clause is not applicable.
The question, then, is whether a § 924(d) forfeiture
proceeding is intended to be, or by its nature necessarily is,
criminal and punitive, or civil and remedial."
Our inquiry proceeded in two stages. In the first stage, we
looked to Congress' intent, and concluded that "Congress
designed forfeiture under § 924(d) as a remedial civil
sanction.... In the second stage of our analysis, we looked
to "'whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either in
purpose or effect as to negate' Congress' intention to
establish a civil remedial mechanism."
Our cases reviewing civil forfeitures under the Double
Jeopardy Clause adhere to a remarkably consistent theme.
Though the two-part analytical construct employed ... was
more refined, perhaps, than that we had used over 50 years
earlier •.. , the conclusion was the same in each case: in rem
civil forfeiture is a remedial civil sanction, distinct from
potentially punitive in personam civil penalties such as fines,
and does not constitute a punishment under the Double
Jeopardy Clause.56

IV. UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS AND THE ENTRAPMENT
DEFENSE

Law enforcement officials often find it essential, in investigating
56. Id. at 274, 277-78 (citations omitted). Of course, other narrower
procedural issues are also present. See, e.g., United States v. Tencer, 107 F.3d 1120
(5th Cir. 1997) (concerning assets legitimately and illegitimately obtained); Bye
v. United States, 105 F.3d 856 (2d Cir. 1997) (concerning notice requirements).
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organized crime, to engage in long term undercover investigations
or "sting operations." In such situations, however, an entrapment
defense is often raised.57 All United States jurisdictions now provide
for the defense of entrapment. The basic purpose behind
recognizing entrapment is to prevent the government from
manufacturing crime.58 American judges have struggled in
attempting to define the distinction between improper government
inducement and appropriate investigative tools. For example, it is
not entrapment for a police officer simply to offer to purchase
narcotics at the going price from someone believed to be a drug
dealer. However, it may be entrapment for a police officer to
persuade a suspect to sell narcotics by pretending to be the suspect's
friend and applying immense pressure in playing on the sympathies
of the suspect.59 The United States Supreme Court has set forth the
basic principles governing the defense of entrapment:
[T]here can be no dispute that the Government may use
undercover agents to enforce the law. "It is well settled that
the fact that officers or employees of the Government
merely afford opportunities or facilities for the commission
of the offense does not defeat the prosecution. Artifice and
stratagem may be employed to catch those engaged in
criminal enterprises."
In their zeal to enforce the law, however, Government
agents may not originate a criminal design, implant in an
innocent person's mind the disposition to commit a
criminal act, and then induce commission of the crime so
that the Government may prosecute. Where the
Government has induced an individual to break the law and
the defense of entrapment is at issue . . . the prosecution
must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant was
57. See generally Paul Marcus, Presenting, Back from the [Almost] Dead, the
Entrapment Defense, 47 U. FLA. L. REV. 205 (1996).
58. See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 434 (1963). See generally United
States v. Cecil, 96 F.3d 1344, 1347-49 (lOth Cir. 1996).
59. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
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disposed to commit the criminal act prior to first being
approached by Government agents.60
In Sorrells v. United States, 61 the Supreme Court held that a
defendant cannot assert the entrapment defense if all the defendant
shows is that the government provided the opportunity to commit
a crime.62 It also found, though, that the government's action may
not "implant in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to
commit the alleged offense and induce its commission in order that
they may prosecute. "63 This difference was based on the Court's
view concerning the purpose of legislators in enacting criminal
statutes. The Court reasoned that the statute was being abused by
the government.64 These statutes were not made part of the law so
that the government could induce an otherwise innocent person to
commit a crime just so that person could be punished. By looking
to the "innocent" state of mind of the accused, the Justices
established a subjective approach to the defense. 65
The dissenting Justices in Sorrells reached a very different result
as to entrapment. They enunciated the reasoning behind the
objective test for entrapment. The minority discussed the public
policy justifications for entrapment and concluded that the question
of entrapment properly belongs to the judge, rather than the jury,
and that the principal question would be to ask if the government
acted responsibly in its investigations:
The applicable principle is that courts must be closed to the
trial of a crime instigated by the government's own agents.
No other issue, no comparison of equities as between the
guilty official and the guilty defendant, has any place in the
60. Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 548-49 {1992) (quoting Sorrells

v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441 (1932)) (citations omitted).
61. 287 u.s. 435 (1932)
62. See id at 442.

63.Id
64. See id at 443-44.
65. Seeid

1396

THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:1379

enforcement of this overruling principle of public policy. 66
Although all states have an entrapment defense, they vary
considerably its definition and application. Because the entrapment
defense is not constitutionally based, states may use any test desired,
and apply the defense as they decide. In most states, entrapment
will be seen as a factual matter, to be resolved generally by the jury.
In other states, especially those applying the objective test, it is seen
as a question of law for the trial judge. Moreover, in some states if
the defendant denies participation in the crime, the defense of
entrapment is waived. In other states, and in the federal system, the
defendant may raise the defense of entrapment, even while denying
participation in the offense. In Mathews v. United States, 67 the
Supreme Court allowed the defense of entrapment to be considered
even if the defendant denied meeting the elements of the charged
crime. 68
The difference in entrapment laws between the states and the
federal system is largely due to the varying purposes behind
entrapment. States that see entrapment as a curb on law
enforcement use an objective standard where only the actions of the
law enforcement are important. Other jurisdictions are primarily
concerned with the mental state of the individual. These states look
to see if the defendant is an innocent person coerced or persuaded
into committing the crime. In these jurisdictions, the test for
entrapment is subjective. The Supreme Court has repeatedly
reaffirmed the subjective test in federal entrapment cases.69
With the subjective test as used by the federal courts, the trier
of fact must determine the state of mind of the defendant at a
particular time.7° The issue of timing can become critical, for many
66. !d. at 459 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
67. 485 u.s. 58 (1987}.
68. See id at 63.
69. See id. at 66-67 (Brennan, J., concurring), where the final dissenter on the
topic, Justice Brennan, conceded the lack of controversy over the application of
the subjective test for entrapment.
70. See United States v. Yater, 756 F.2d 1058, 1062 (5th Cir. 1985).
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investigations can last for weeks, months, or even years. The
question then becomes whether the jury or judge is to look to the
state of mind of the defendant at the moment of solicitation, during
the period of solicitation) or before the soljcitation began.
The United States Supreme Court answered this question in
jacobson v. United States.71 The Court found that the government
must show that the defendant was tr:uly predisposed to commit the
crime and that a mere "inclination" to engage in activity is not
enough.72 The defendant there was targeted by the government for
twenty-six months through repeated mailings asking about his
interest in child pornography, mailings that claimed to be from
organizations that were in favor of allowing people to view child
pomography.73 At the end of this extended period the agents asked
the defendant to order child pornography and he responded
immediately/4 A search of the defendant's home found magazines
that featured child pornography, but the defendant had purchased
these magazines before they became illegal to receive them through
the maiF5 The Court held that the prosecution only showed a
predisposition to view child pornography, not a predisposition to
commit an illegal act.76 In deciding the appropriate time period for
consideration, the Court looked not simply at the moment when
the defendant was actually solicited by the government agents.
Instead, it indicated that courts should focus on the entire period of
government involvement.77 With that twenty-six month period in
mind, the Court found entrapment as a matter of law and dismissed
the criminal changes against the defendant. 78
The jacobson opinion has been highly influential throughout the
United States. Several courts have construed it broadly in terms of

u.s.

71. 503
540 (1992).
72. See id. at 549.
73. See id at 543-47.
74. See id at 547.
75. Seeid
76. See id at 551.
77. See id. at 553.
78. See id at 554.
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requiring a careful scrutiny of both the defendant's state of mind
and the intensity of the government's involvement in the criminal
enterprise. One federal court stated the matter plainly:
The defendant must be so situated by reason of previous
training or experience or occupation or acquaintances that
it is likely that if the government had not induced him to
commit the crime some criminal would have done so; only
then does a sting or other arranged crime take a dangerous
person out of circulation/9
Even after jacobson, it is clear that judges mUst look at the extent of
the government involvement in inducing the defendant to commit
the crime. Later lower federal cases and many state courts still use
a subjective test for entrapment. In essence, the question has now
become: Would this sort of crime have occurred without the
persuasion of the government agent? If the answer is no, i.he courts
can find that the governmental involvement was too great, the
predisposition of the defendant too weak, and the entrapment
defense can be proved, perhaps even as a matter of law.
In states which follow the objective test it is the actions of the
government which are essential. The conduct of the accused is not
normally a relevant issue. Instead, the question is whether the
actions of the government were sufficient to induce an average, lawabiding person to commit a crime. Under this inquiry, it should
not matter whether this particular defendant was disposed to
commit the crime. Examples of improper inducement under the
objective standard are physical threats, sexual favors, appeals to
sympathy and friendship, and the possibility of exorbitant gain. 80
One of the leading entrapment cases under the objective view is the
California Supreme Court's decision in People v. Barraza. 81 The
79. United States v. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d 1196, 1200 (7th Cir. 1994) (en
bane); see Marcus, supra note 57. But see United States v. Thickstun, 110 F.3d
1394 (9th Cir. 1997).
80. See People v. Barraza, 591 P.2d 947, 955 (Cal. 1979).
81. Id.
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court presumed that a normally law-abiding person would "resist
the temptation to commit a crime presented by the single
opportunity to act unlawfully. "82 It found that "if the actions of the
law enforcement agent would generate in a normally law-abiding
person a motive for the crime other than ordinary criminal intent,
entrapment will be established."83 Also, if affirmative police
conduct would make commission of the crime especially attractive
to a normally law-abiding person, that will also constitute
entrapment. 84
While the two approaches-subjective and objective-may
appear mutually exclusive, some states have combined the tests
either by judicial determination, or by a blend of state
constitutional principles and statutory enactments. 85 In these states,
the court determines if the defendant is predisposed to commit the
crime. If the defendant is not predisposed, then entrapment
occurred. If the defendant possessed that state of mind, the court
will consider the government's conduct to decide if a law abiding
person might have been induced under the circumstances by the
extreme governmental action.86
The preference for one test or another, as previously stated,
depends on the goals for the entrapment defense. When the state
wants to make sure only the guilty-minded are punished, it will
apply the subjective test. If the state wishes to use the defense to
limit questionable police conduct, it will apply the objective test.
The advantage to the subjective test is that it only ~eeks to punish
those who are culpable. The disadvantage is that entrapment must
be decided on a case-by-case basis. This type of determination is
time-consuming and has little precedential value, as each case will
have a different defendant and a unique fact pattern. The advantage
82. Id. at 955.
83./d.
84. Seeid.
85. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-12 (West 1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 626:5 (1996).
86. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-12(a)(1)-(2) (West 1995); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 626:5 (1996).
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of the objective test is that cases have more precedential impact
because the review is of the police conduct. The disadvantage is that
a guilty person may not be subject to criminal liability.
While numerous procedural and evidentiary issues concerning
the entrapment defense can be found, 87 the major debate over the
defense has been which test to apply and how much government
inducement will be allowed before it is found to constitute
improper activity.
V. CONCLUSION
Legislators and judges in the United States have given law
enforcement officers considerable weapons in the fight against
organized crime. In this article, I have discussed three of the most
important: the allowance of broadened application of the search
and seizure provisions of the federal Constitution, the use of
forfeiture procedures, and the ability to engage in long term
undercover investigations and "sting" operations.
While each of the three certainly provides strong support to law
enforcement, each creates serious questions of law and policy. The
Fourth Amendment concerns are deeply felt and will continue to
be raised in cases involving arguable invasions of privacy. Forfeiture
which impacts on the assets of innocent individuals will give rise to
proposals to limit sharply the reach of property seizure rules.
Finally, the entrapment defense can be expected to be asserted, and
applied, ever more vigorously as we see continued long term,
intensive investigations of criminal activities.

87. For instance, these issues concern the nature of the evidence allowed to
show predisposition, actions of private individuals working on behalf of the
government, and so on. See Marcus, supra note 57.

